procedure reveals the modification that the tl experience produced. The question of interest is always whether a particular tl experience produces an outcome at t2 that is absent without that experience. Consequently, studies of learning typically compare the behavior of two organisms at t2, those who have been exposed to the tl experience of interest and those who have been spared that exposure and instead had some "control" experience at that time. One can organize many of the commonly studied elementary learning paradigms in terms of the different types of experience that they arrange for the animal at tl and the different techniques that they use for assessing that learning at t2.
Type of Experience
Organisms might be expected to benefit from a rich array of types of experience. However, psychologists studying nonhuman learning have conventionally categorized experience into three classes. These can all be described in terms of the different modes in which the organism is presented with a stimulus, call it S1.
1. The most primitive thing that can be learned about a stimulus is that it exists. A procedure that is presumably adequate for such learning is the simple presentation of S1 to the organism without any.other explicit constraint. The question is whether simple exposure to a stimulus at tl leaves an after-effect that can be measured at a later time, t2. Of course, the most commonly studied example is habituation, in which the aftereffect measured is a decreased response to the stimulus at t2. But, as described below, many other consequences of simple stimulus presentation are detected by other assessment techniques. Whatever the assessment technique, one can think of a simple presentation procedure as affording the animal the opportunity to learn of the existence and properties of the stimulus.
2. In order to survive, organisms must learn more than the existence of individual stimuli in the world; they must learn something of the structure of the environment, the relations among the stimuli. Hence an important second mode of presentation arranges a relation between S1 and some other stimulus, $2. The question is whether exposure to that relation modifies the organism in a manner that can be detected at t2. The most common example is Pavlovian conditioning, in which $2 signals the occurrence of S 1. In that context, the $2 is termed the conditioned stimulus (CS) and Sl the unconditioned stimulus (US). The conventional result is that the organism shows an augmented response to the CS during the t2 assessment. This sort of treatment and outcome form the basis of the assertion that an association has formed between CS and US. The learning www.annualreviews.org/aronline Annual Reviews of relations among stimuli has been extensively studied at the behavioral level and is discussed at length below.
3. Finally, a successful organism might be expected to learn about the impact that its own actions have on the world. A tl experience adequate to produce such learning would consist of exposure to a relation between S1 and the organism's own behavior. In that context, S1 is commonly labeled a "reinforcer," or "reward," or "punisher." When such an arrangement of a relation between a response and reinforcer produces a change in the likelihood of that response during the subsequent t2 assessment, one normally speaks of "instrumental learning" or "operant conditioning."
A useful example of such presentation modes can be given with food as the S1 for a hungry animal such as a rat. Such an animal will show learning of all three types about a food S1. It learns about the existence of food, as well as the relation of that food to other stimuli and to its own behavior.
First, like many animals, rats are initially hesitant to consume an unfamiliar food substance. But they will show habituation of this initial aversive reaction simply as a result of repeated exposure to the substance. Animals tested for their response at t2 after exposure to food at tl will consume more than do animals not so exposed (e.g. Rozin, 1976) . Second, if at some other event, such as increased illumination, signals the coming of food, then the animal will learn that relation, as exhibited in various ways, such as subsequently increased general excitement and salivation during the light. Finally, if one arranges a relation between some aspect of the rat's behavior (such as depressing a lever) and the occurrence of food, the animal will show instrumental learning, as exhibited by increased likelihood of pressing that lever. When described in an abstract way, ignoring the identities of the stimuli and organism, these three types of tl experience encompass the vast majority of behavioral studies of simple learning processes. They involve teaching the organism about the existence of a stimulus, about the relation of that stimulus to other stimuli in its environment, and about the relation of that stimulus to the animal's own behavior. One might argue that if we can understand how organisms learn these three things about a stimulus, we will have close to a complete characterization of how they learn about events in their environment. It is just such a characterization that the modern psychology of learning takes as its job.
Types of Assessment: Consequences for Behavior
For each of the different types of S1 experience at tl, there is a range of different consequences in the animal's behavior and therefore a range of techniques that can be used to assess learning at t2. Although some changes www.annualreviews.org/aronline Annual Reviews in behavior at t2 are studied more often than others, many different types of change can be used to infer the occurrence of learning. It is useful to classify the changes in behavior at t2 into three categories: changes in response evocation, changes in learnability, and changes in value.
These distinctions are most readily illustrated for the case of simple exposure to S1. Of course, there are many instances in which simple exposure to some stimulus seems to produce learning, but the way in which that learning expresses itself at t2 can be quite varied.
1. The most common technique is to assess the likelihood that S1 will evoke a response. A frequent result is "habituation," in which as a result of its presentation at tl, the stimulus S1 will evoke a smaller response at t2. That outcome is widespread among stimuli and species (e.g. Peeke Hertz 1973), but it can also happen that simple exposure can augment the response to S1; in that case it is conventional to speak of "sensitization" occurring. More generally, learning at tl can be indexed by any change in the form of the response elicited at t2.
2. Another very useful procedure assesses the ability of S 1 to enter into new learning at t2. For instance, it is well documented that repeated presentation of a stimulus at tl greatly interferes with the animal's subsequent ability to learn new Pavlovian associative relations about that stimulus. The interference shows up whether the exposed stimulus is subsequently used as the signal or as the consequence in a Pavlovian paradigm. Thus if in a t2 assessment period a rat receives the pairing of a light with a shock, the learning of that relation is substantially retarded by the simple exposure at tl of either the light or the shock. Retardation produced by exposure to the light has been termed "latent inhibition" (Lubow 1973) whereas that produced by exposure to the shock is called the "US-preexposure effect" (Randich & LoLordo 1979) . In both instances learning occurs because of simple presentation of a stimulus at tl; but that learning is assessed at t2 not in terms of response evocation but instead in terms of the ability for new learning to occur.
3. Finally, learning as a result of simple exposure to a stimulus can be measured in terms of changes in the value of that stimulus. By "value" I mean the ability of that stimulus to serve as a reinforcer in an instrumental learning situation. A frequent occurrence is that exposure to a reinforcer at t 1 reduces its ability to produce instrumental learning at t2. For instance, repeated exposure to an electric shock will reduce the ability of that shock to punish a level press. One can make a similar point about the range of assessment procedures for the other modes of presentation at tl. For instance, the Pavlovian conditioning that results from the signaling of US by CS is commonly www.annualreviews.org/aronline Annual Reviews assessed by the increased ability of CS to evoke a response; however, other changes in the CS sometimes provide a better measure. The ability of a CS to interfere with learning about other stimuli (so-called "blocking," see below) or to produce second-order conditioning is an excellent alternative measure of its prior conditioning. Consider, for instance, second-order conditioning as an index of a CS-US association. A CS that has signaled a US also takes on the ability to establish Pavlovian conditioning to other events by which it is signaled itself. As Pavlov (1927) first demonstrated, a light paired with food not only evokes salivation but also becomes capable of conditioning salivation to a tone. Rescorla (1980) has argued that this ability of the light to "second-order" condition a tone is often the best procedure for measuring the fact that the light has become conditioned by the US. The advantages of this procedure are particularly clear when one wants to compare the amounts of conditioning to qualitatively different CSs. An important fact about Pavlovian conditioning that is still poorly appreciated is that different CSs often evoke quite different response forms after conditioning with the same US (Holland, 1984) . One way overcome the consequent difficulty in comparing the amounts of conditioning these CSs control is to measure learning not in terms of the responses that they evoke but in terms of their success at second-order conditioning a common target stimulus. Associations between neutral stimuli or between discrete signals and the contexts in which they occur are also often best studied using techniques like second-order conditioning (e.g. Rescorla 1984) .
The important point is that a variety of techniques is available for use at t2 to assess the learning that occurred at tl. That learning can be assessed by changes in response evocation, stimulus conditionability, or reinforcement value. Modern behavioral conceptions of learning do not view it as the modification of a particular response pattern. Instead, learning is thought of as an internal change as a result of experience, a change that can be exhibited in various ways. How any learning will be exhibited depends on the demands that the world, and the experimenter, subsequently make upon the organism. It follows that although some means of detecting learning are more conventional than others, there is no a priori reason to favor one technique. Rather one should be eclectic and pick the detection technique that is best suited to exposing learning in the particular preparation one wishes to study. Such eclecticism has greatly facilitated the behavioral study of learning in the last several decades.
An Implication:
Avoid Acquisition Curves I have described learning in terms of differences in t2 behavior as a function of differences in tl experiences. It is important to note that I have not www.annualreviews.org/aronline Annual Reviews characterized learning as a change in behavior from tl to t2. The former description encourages one to study learning by exposing different animals to different experiences at one time and then assessing this learning by a common test procedure at a later time. That in turn leads naturally to a distinction between learning (and the conditions that obtain at the time of learning) and performance (and the conditions that obtain at the time test). Describing learning as a change in behavior instead encourages one to study learning by tracking the changes that take place over the course of exposure to a treatment. Unfortunately, that often results in interpretative difficulties. One problem is that the behavior of an organism may differ at tl and t2 for many reasons, such as developmental changes over time. Consequently, a before/after assessment of a treatment is rarely informative by itself; it must be compared with a similar assessment in animals given a different (control) treatment at t 1. A less widely recognized problem is that comparison of behavior at t l and t2 (or in the course of an ongoing treatment) can inadvertently lead to overlooking the important distinction between learning and performance. This can sometimes lead to a profound misinterpretation of the nature of the learning process under study (see Rescorla & Holland 1976 ).
The habituation paradigm provides a convenient example of the second problem. It is common in studies of habituation to track the course of decrease in response when a stimulus is repeatedly applied. That course can be studied as a function of such primitive variables as stimulus intensity, modality, and spacing (e.g. Thompson & Spencer 1966) . For instance, one commonly observed result is that more response decrement occurs when the presented stimulus is less intense, an observation that has led to the inference that habituation is greater for weaker stimuli. But such tracking of the decrement entirely confounds the conditions of learning with the conditions of assessing that learning. When we observe differences in responding on trial n, we do not know whether to attribute them to differences in the stimulus intensity to which the animals were exposed on the previous n-1 trials or to differences in the stimulus intensity to which they are responding on trial n. The animals differ both in the learning experience they have had and in the conditions under which we assess that learning. In order to separate those alternatives, we need to expose different animals to different intensities for the first n-1 trials (at what we might identify as tl) and then test them with a common intensity, a common assessment procedure (at t2). If lower intensity stimuli indeed lead to more habituation, then we would expect n-1 trials of low intensity to result in a lower response to a common test intensity at t2. However, when Davis & Wagner (1968) performed quite an elegant study of that sort with the www.annualreviews.org/aronline Annual Reviews startle response in rats, they found just the opposite outcome. When assessed by the response to a common test intensity, greater habituation had resulted from exposure to more, rather than less, intense stimuli. This then is a case in which failure to be explicit about the logic of different learning conditions at tl measured by common assessment procedures at t2 has led to important interpretive difficulties. Although this empirical outcome may vary from preparation to preparation, the conceptual point is important to remember. The assessment of the impact of an independent variable on learning can only be made when a common test procedure is employed.
This conceptual point is not confined to studies of habituation. In fact, any time that one attempts to study the effects of any independent variable on any learning process by plotting an acquisition function, one risks confusing the conditions of learning with those of assessment. During acquisition itself, we cannot safely attribute response differences to the conditions of learning over trials n-1 as distinct from the conditions of performance on trial n. Indeed, one could easily defend the position that the worst way to study learning is to look at the acquisition curve. It almost of necessity will confound the conditions of learning with those of performance. The importance of having an explicit test procedure that guarantees comparable assessment conditions for animals subjected to different learning conditions is a very elementary point. But it is so regularly overlooked, often resulting in considerable conceptual confusion, that it must be emphasized again and again.
The same logic, of course, points to the inappropriateness of studying extinction by tracking the decrement observed under nonreinforcement. The shift from training to extinction commonly involves many changes, such as deletion of all deliveries of the US. These changes may be expected to have important effects on performance quite aside from any impact on associative learning. Consequently, the simple observation that behavior declines during extinction is very difficult to interpret. A superior procedure for studying extinction would subject some animals (or some equivalently trained stimuli within the same animal) to an extinction treatment, spare others that treatment, and then give both groups (or stimuli) a common test session. This procedure would allow one to assess the experiential consequences of extinction independently of any local performance effects.
In summary, it is quite useful to keep deliberately in mind an elementary structure for studying learning that acknowledges a time of input and a time of assessment. This not only provides a structure in which to think about different learning procedures, it also provides a certain measure of protection against some important conceptual pitfalls.
PAVLOVIAN ASSOCIATIONS
The study of learning at the behavioral level has been dominated by associative paradigms. In the last 20 years considerable energy has gone into the collection of data and development of theories for the particular instance of Pavlovian conditioning, in which the organism is asked to learn the relation between two stimuli. In this section, I discuss four key notions in modern thinking about Pavlovian associations: contiguity, information, inhibition, and salience. My intention is to characterize current thinking and to give an overview of some of the facts that seem relatively secure and general.
Contiguity
I described Pavlovian conditioning above as the arranging of a relation between two stimuli, S 1 and $2 (the US and CS). But until quite recently, the only relation that one took seriously was temporal contiguity. One of the oldest ideas in the study of learning is that contiguity is the key notion in the formation of associations (see Warren 1921) . Certainly there broad agreement with the general statement that two events that are contiguous in time are more likely to become associated than are two that are separated. But what can we say beyond that global statement? Here I try to make three more subtle points about the notion of contiguity.
The first point is an old one but requires some elaboration: In many situations strict simultaneity of occurrence between CS and US does not in fact optimally produce associative learning. Although there are wellcontrolled reports of substantial conditioning with simultaneous conditioning (e.g. Heth & Rescorla 1973 , Rescorla 1981 ), conditioning appears almost universally to be best when there is a slight temporal asynchrony in which the CS precedes the US by a small time interval. That point is made graphically in Figure 1 , which is elaboration of one presented by Mackintosh (1983) . The figure displays the amounts of responding obtained when the CS-US interval is varied in six representative, and frequently employed, Pavlovian conditioning preparations. These preparations differ in the species investigated (rat, pigeon, and rabbit), the nature of the US (food, water, shock, LiC1), the nature of the CS (auditory, visual, gustatory), and how the learning is assessed (latency, likelihood, and magnitude of an elicited response, as well as ability to serve as a reinforcer).
There are two points to notice about this figure. First, despite wide procedural differences, the results share a common functional relation. In all cases, the success of conditioning is a nonmonotonic function of the amount of time by which the CS precedes the US. When the precedence www.annualreviews.org/aronline Annual Reviews Barker & Smith (1974) .
is either too short or too long, conditioning is relatively poor. But for each preparation there is some intermediate set of intervals that is successful. Second, these preparations show variation over widely different time scales. For instance, the eyelid preparation shows an optimum when the asynchrony is a few hundred milliseconds. But the time scales and optima are plotted in seconds and even hours for the other preparations. Indeed, because the results in Figure 1 were chosen to show the nature of the overall functions, they fail to display the fact that the preparations also differ widely in the maximum interval over which they will sustain conditioning. In the eyelid preparation, conditioning typically fails when the interval exceeds a few seconds, whereas in conditioned suppression, learning is routinely obtained with intervals of 5 min, and in flavor-aversion conditioning has sometimes been obtained at intervals of 12 hr. Of course, detailed comparisons of this sort across diverse preparations are fraught with technical difficulties (Mackintosh 1983) , but the data suggest that there is no absolute temporal interval that produces the best conditioning www.annualreviews.org/aronline Annual Reviews across the ra .~ge of preparations. What conditioning preparations share is the general lbrm of the function, not the absolute values. Although this has been known for many years, a surprising number of workers still apparently expect all conditioning preparations to adhere to a mythical 0.5 sec optimum interval. But there is no reason to celebrate the finding that a particular CS-US interval is especially effective. It is not the parameter values but rather the sharing of functional form that encourages the view that a common process may be involved across a range of preparations.
The second point to be made about contiguity is that there is some evidence that within a preparation it is relative, rather than absolute, time that matters. In particular, the success with which a given CS-US temporal interval produces an association may depend heavily on the temporal interval between trials. Some of the best evidence for this comes from the autoshaping preparation, which has recently been studied in some quantitative detail (e.g. Gibbon et al 1977) . Figure 2 shows some representative data from a study that varied both the CS-US interval and the time between trials. The left-hand portion of the figure plots the number of trials to an acquisition criterion as a function of the interval between trials. The data points are joined for the groups sharing a CS-US interval. The negative slope of the functions indicates that the more widely spaced the CS-US trials, the faster the learning. The ordering of the lines within the figure indicates that, within the range studied, the shorter the CS-US interval the faster the learning. Neither of these findings is very surprising. In the left panel, data from the same CS-US interval are connected. In the right panel, data from the same ratio of ITI to CS-US interval are connected. The value of that ratio is indicated next to each curve. Data are from Gibbon et al (1977) .
www.annualreviews.org/aronline Annual Reviews However, the right-hand panel of Figure 2 highlights a feature of these data that is surprising and important. It reproduces the same data, but joins the points from the groups that share the same ratio of intertrial interval to CS-US interval. The striking result is that these curves are nearly flat. This indicates that over quite a broad range of absolute values, the speed of acquisition is relatively constant when that ratio is constant. That suggests that the CS-US contiguity is evaluated not absolutely but in relation to the intertrial interval. Sufficient data are not available to decide the range of conditioning preparations over which this regularity holds, but the results of early experiments by Stein et al (1958) suggest that it may also apply to conditioned suppression in the rat. A constancy of this sort clearly places important constraints on the potential mechanisms that underlie conditioning. Gibbon (1981) discusses several alternative theoretical interpretations of this constraint.
The third point to appreciate is that the contiguity between CS and US can be important for quite different reasons. It is most natural to interpret variation in the CS-US interval as producing variation in the degree or nature of the association between the CS and US. However, in some instances the CS-US contiguity matters not because it promotes an association between the US and the CS but rather because it gives the US the opportunity to modulate other learning about the CS. Two examples are worth mentioning. The first involves the habituation that the CS might undergo because of its repeated presentation. It is now well-documented that the period immediately after a stimulus presentation is importantly involved in the development of habituation.~Most relevant here, salient events that occur immediately after a stimulus presentation can disrupt habituation to that stimulus (e.g. Wagner 1978) . Consequently, arranging for a US to be contiguous with a CS can affect subsequent responding to a CS because that contiguity modulates the success of habituation to the CS. Indeed, it is frequently difficult to separate this modulation of a nonassociative process from the operation of an associative process linking the CS and US. A second example is more subtle but equally important. Sometimes the contiguity of S1 to $2 apparently acts to help establish associations between $2 and another stimulus, $3. In this case, S1 plays a true catalytic role, inducing an association between $2 and $3 by virtue of its contiguity to each (see Rescorla 1982a) . The fact that contiguity between two stimuli can have important learning effects other than to promote their association, of course, can greatly complicate the study of associative learning. Rescorla (1982b) discusses techniques for separating these alternative modes of action of contiguity. One might note that classical S-R reinforcement theories of instrumental learning appeal to just such a catalytic process. According to such theories the reinforcer's proximity to the response encourages the development of an association between that response and antecedent stimuli.
These comments make it clear that contiguity is actually quite complex in its effects on learning. Across conditioning situations there is not a common time interval that optimizes conditioning, and within a situation it may be relative rather than absolute time that determines conditioning. Moreover, contiguity can have its effects for multiple reasons, both associative and nonassociative. Any successful search for the neural mechanisms of contiguity's action in learning must be aware of these complexities.
Information
The second key notion in modern thinking about conditioning is that of information. Many have shared the intuition that the functional significance of the CS is to serve as a signal of the US. For instance, that intuition has often been used to explain why the CS should shortly precede the US in order to produce conditioning. Only CSs that precede USs can provide useful information about them. It is now widely agreed that an informational intuition is a useful heuristic. Indeed, several authors have noted that the CS/US relations required for conditioning are very similar to those that a rational scientist would demand to conclude that the CS is the cause of the US (e.g. Dickinson 1980 , Rescorla 1985b .
This intuition appears in modern thinking as a further constraint on the operation of contiguity. Current evidence indicates that the simple contiguity between CS and US produces poor conditioning unless that CS also bears an informational relation to the US. I describe below two nowclassic experiments that lead to this conclusion, experiments that have had a profound impact on our thinking about conditioning. Both experiments reveal instances in which an otherwise excellent CS-US contiguity fails to produce associative learning because of the absence of an informational relation between CS and US.
The first example is the phenomenon of "blocking," initially reported by Kamin (1968) . Kamin's experiments involved fear conditioning which rat subjects received a 3-min CS preceding the occurrence of a mild footshock US. In such procedures a few pairings are sufficient to produce a CS-US association that expresses itself as the interruption of ongoing activity during subsequent presentation of the CS. The comparison of interest was between two groups, both of which received a compound CS consisting of a light and a noise presented simultaneously prior to the shock. Interest focused on the amount of conditioning gained by the noise, as assessed when that stimulus was presented alone in a subsequent test phase. The groups differed only in their history prior to the conditioning of the compound. One group had received repeated light-shock pairings www.annualreviews.org/aronline Annual Reviews and the other had been spared that treatment. Kamin found that the group without pretraining on the light showed substantial fear of the noise; however, the group with a history of light-alone conditioning showed almost no conditioning of the noise. Pretraining on the light had blocked the noise conditioning that would ordinarily have occurred when the light/noise compound was followed by shock. The important point to notice is that both groups received the same noise-shock contiguity, yet the levels of conditioning differed substantially. Intuitively, the reason is obvious: The noise provided quite different amounts of information about the shock in the two groups. For the pretrained animals, the light already signaled the coming of shock and the noise was redundant, adding no new information. Apparently, a demonstrably effective contiguity can be rendered ineffective in the absence of an informational relation.
The second example comes from experiments demonstrating the importance of the CS/US contingency, as distinct from the CS/US contiguity, in producing conditioning (Rescorla 1968) . The typical Pavlovian experiment intends, of course, to arrange for the CS and US to be contiguous. But it commonly arranges a much stronger relation, in which the CS is informative about the US. This is because the likelihood of obtaining a US is substantially greater given the occurrence of the CS than it is given the absence of the CS. However, one may disentangle contiguity from information by systematically varying the probability of the US given a CS [p(US/CS)] and the probability of a US given no CS [p(US/~ CS)]. Figure  3 shows the results of one experiment that did this in a conditioned suppression paradigm (Rescorla 1968 www.annualreviews.org/aronline Annual Reviews conditioning, indexed by the degree to which the CS interupts ongoing behavior, against the probability of the US in the presence of the CS. The parameter in the figure is the probability of the US in the absence of the CS. When the conventional procedure of holdingp(US/,-~ CS) at 0 is used (uppermost curve), conditioning increases monotonically with increases in the value ofp(US/CS). In fact, conditioning is an increasing function p(US/CS) whatever the value of p(US/~ CS). However, the interesting finding is that for any given degree of CS-US contiguity Lo(US/CS)], conditioning depends heavily on the likelihood of the US in the absence of the CS. The functions in Figure 3 are ordered by p(US/~ CS); the greater that probability the lower the conditioning. Consequently in order to predict the success of conditioning, one needs to know both probabilities; it is their relationship that orders the data. Figure 3 . Stated differently, conditioning depends on the correlation of two events, not their contiguity. Again, the informational intuition is easy to apply. When the CS signals no change in the ongoing likelihood of the US, it is not informative no matter how good the contiguity; under those circumstances one would not intuitively expect much conditioning. Both of these basic experiments have now been replicated in a variety of conditioning preparations. While the details of the results vary across preparations, the basic phenomena have considerable generality (Mackintosh 1983) . As a result they have had a profound effect modern thinking about the development of Pavlovian associations.
Conditioning occurs to the degree that p(US/CS) exceeds p(US/~ CS). Even when p(US/CS) is high, there is little evidence of conditioning when p(US/~ CS) is equally high, as in the left-most point of each function in
Of course, simple appeal to the information intuition is not a satisfactory explanation of such phenomena. Rather, these results have provided the occasion for rethinking the notion of contiguity. In both kinds of experiment the problem is that an apparently adequate contiguity failed to produce learning. Consequently, the issue is what was wrong with those contiguities. Why did the embedding of joint CS/US occurrences in these conditioning procedures prevent them from yielding conditioning? Two classes of theories have been suggested, both of which retain the primacy of contiguity, each pointing to a failure of processing of one of the events in the contiguity. According to these theories, the failure lies in the fact that either the CS or the US was inadequately processed and hence the nominal contiguity did not actually obtain. The variables that are intuitively identified with information value in fact matter because they affect the processing of either the CS or the US and hence actually destroy the contiguity intended.
These two accounts can best be understood by looking at how they deal www.annualreviews.org/aronline Annual Reviews with the phenomenon of blocking. Deficits in CS processing are perhaps the most obvious account of blocking (e.g. Sutherland & Mackintosh 1971 , Mackintosh 1975 . The intuitive idea is that of attention: As a result of the initial conditioning of the light, the animal attends to that light. When the noise is then added on compound trials, the attention to the light adversely affects that to the noise, resulting in less successful processing of the noise. Because the noise is not well processed, it does not benefit from the actual contiguity that the experimenter has arranged with the US. A less obvious alternative is a deficit in US processing (e.g. . The intuitive notion here is that an expected US is less effective in engaging the learning mechanism. Hence the problem on lightnoise compound trials is that the shock is less effective at producing new learning because it is well signaled by the light. Although these two classes of theories are commonly described as competitors, in fact they share a good many features. For instance, both view contiguity as ultimately responsible for conditioning. They offer ways in which apparently informational relations can be reduced to a somewhat more complex version of contiguity. Both argue that learning occurs when there is a discrepancy between the current level of conditioning that a stimulus controls and the level appropriate to the US that follows that CS. Put casually, both view the organism as only learning when it is "surprised" by the outcome. In that sense, both types of theory are relativistic: USs are evaluated not in absolute terms but in relation to the USs anticipated by the CS. Moreover, both are elementaristic models in which complex stimuli are viewed as composed of elements and total conditioning to a complex is understood in terms of the conditioning of those elements. Finally, both types of theories see the associations among those elements as interacting in important ways. They see the animal as operating within a limited capacity system in which CSs compete either for processing or for the amount of association that they develop. It is that competition that lies at the heart of their ability to explain the animal's sensitivity to information, rather than simple contiguity.
Although I describe these accounts quite casually here, in fact substantial formal versions have been developed for both the CS-processing (e.g. Mackintosh 1975 , Moore & Stickney 1980 , Pearce & Hall 1980 ) and the US-processing (e.g. models. Such models have enjoyed both striking successes and humbling failures in describing available data and generating new findings (see Mackintosh 1983 , Rescorla Holland 1982 . Both have begun to influence the thinking of those studying the neural basis of learning (e.g. Farley & Alkon 1985 , Gluck & Thompson 1987 , Hawkins & Kandel 1984 . Conventional wisdom is that both kinds of theories make a contribution to learning as studied at the behavioral www.annualreviews.org/aronline Annual Reviews level. As a result there have been some attempts to provide an integration of the two approaches (e.g. Wagner 1981 ).
At the gross behavioral level the animal is much more sophisticated than classical accounts of Pavlovian conditioning anticipate. A simpleminded contiguity mechanism clearly fails to capture the animal's associative learning. Many organisms are very demanding of the evidence that they obtain from experience before they learn an association between the CS and US. The phenomena briefly described above give only a rough feeling for that sophistication. In fact, those results are but a small portion of the large literature that modern behavioral theories have generated (see Dickinson 1980 , Rescorla & Holland 1982 , Mackintosh 1983 ). Phenomena such as overshadowing, overexpectation, unblocking, superconditioning, learned irrelevance, and conditioned inhibition are mainstays of modern thinking about conditioning. They all represent sophisticated features of Pavlovian conditioning whose discovery was prompted by an informational perspective; none of them is readily consistent with a simple contiguity theory. The issue now is what more molecular mechanisms described at both the formal and neural level allow this sophisticated behavior. Considerable analytic progress has been made at the behavioral level. It makes sense to build on that progress when one attempts a neural analysis.
Inhibition
The third important notion in modern behavioral studies of learning is that of inhibition. Of course, inhibition is an old notion at many levels of analysis. It has had many different meanings and within psychology it has had a rather checkered history. But it is currently used within the behavioral study of learning to refer to the learning of a particular associative relation among stimuli. As noted above, an informational view has modified our thinking about how contiguity generates learning about positive relations--what is sometimes called excitatory conditioning. Modern thinking about inhibition is a natural extension of that view to the learning of negative relations. In recent years it has become clear that many organisms can learn negative correlations between CS and US and that such learning constitutes more than simply the failure to learn a positive relation (see Miller & Spear 1985) .
The meaning of these assertions can be clarified by describing two procedures that are routinely used to generate conditioned inhibition. The first procedure is a logical extension of the correlation experiment described above. That experiment demonstrated that excitatory conditioning depends on the arrangement of a positive correlation between CS and US. One can similarly show that the arrangement of a negative correlation www.annualreviews.org/aronline Annual Reviews endows the CS with inhibitory properties. Under such circumstances, the CS signals a decrease in the likelihood of the US, a relation that many organisms are capable of learning. The second procedure frequently used to generate a conditioned inhibitor involves intermixing two types of trials; those on which one stimulus, A, is presented alone and followed by the US and those on which A is accompanied by another stimulus, X, and the US is withheld. Under those circumstances, A becomes a conditioned excitor, typically capable of preventing A from evoking that response.
The existence of an inhibitory association can be assessed in a variety of ways. On occasion, an inhibitory CS will evoke a behaviorally detectable response, commonly the opposite of the response that same CS would have evoked had it been trained as an excitor (e.g. Hearst & Franklin 1977) . More often, behaviors observed during an inhibitor do not distinguish it from a stimulus that has never undergone conditioning. Consequently, a variety of other assessment techniques have developed. For instance, a "summation" procedure compares the response to a known excitor when it is presented alone and in combination with the inhibitor. To the degree that the excitor evokes a smaller response in the presence of a stimulus, that stimulus can be identified as an inhibitor; to the degree that this effect depends on a particular training history with the stimulus, it can be identified as a conditioned inhibitor. Alternatively, one could use a "retardation" test in which the putative inhibitor is embedded in a Pavlovian paradigm known to establish a conditioned excitor. To the degree that it develops that excitation less successfully than does a control stimulus, it can be identified as an inhibitor. LoLordo & Fairless (1985) review the results of these and other assessment procedures. Behavioral studies of conditioned inhibition have focused on two questions. The first issue is how one characterizes more fully the circumstances that produce conditioned inhibition. This question was originally motivated by the observation that conditioned inhibition does not accord well with a simple notion that all associative learning depends on contiguity. Inhibition is a case in which contiguity with the US is blatantly the wrong relation for producing learning. However, it is important to realize that one cannot adequately characterize the circumstances producing inhibition as the simple presentation of the CS in the absence of the US. Of course, as noted above, repeated separate presentation of a CS does produce various kinds of learning, such as habituation; but it does not endow a stimulus with conditioned inhibition (Rescorla 1971 , Reiss & Wagner 1972 . Attempts to deal with inhibitory phenomena, such as extinction, solely in terms of decremental mechanisms that depend only on the CS presentation, and not its relation to the US, lead to conceptual difficulties. Gleitman et al (1954) made this point about early Hullian theory; a similar point has recently been noted by Gluck & Thompson (1987) about the Hawkins & Kandel (1984) model. Rather, as in the case of conditioned excitation, the intuition of information is useful: in order for a stimulus to become a conditioned inhibitor it must provide information about the US. Stated casually, the stimulus must signal the deletion of an otherwise expected US. Put somewhat more formally, in order to become an inhibitor, a stimulus must be paired with the absence of a US in the presence of an excitor previously conditioned by that US (see Konorski 1948 , LoLordo & Fairless 1985 . Just as the evaluation of a US was previously seen to be made rdativistically, so the evaluation of the absence of a US is made relative to what might have occurred. As in the case of excitatory conditioning, this proposition can be given a mathematical formulation (e.g. .
Modern work on conditioned inhibition has also focused on a second question: What is learned? The answer to that question now seems likely to depend on the conditioning preparation and the procedures used to establish inhibition. We do not have sufficient data to reach a firm decision, but I can indicate some of the possible learned bases for conditioned inhibition. Those possibilities are best seen if we schemati2e the excitatory association in terms of a learned connection between the CS and US, such that CS is able to activate a representation of the US and hence evoke an observable response, the CR. Within that schematization, four possible loci of action have been proposed (Holland 1985 , Rescorla 1975 . The inhibitor might act to prevent the response, to prevent activation of the US representation, to interfere with processing of the CS, or to interfere with the functioning of the CS-US association. Interruption at any of these loci would prevent the excitatory CS from evoking its customary response. The primary tool that is used for choosing among these alternatives is the transfer test, assessing the range of stimuli and behaviors that are affected by an inhibitor. For instance, if a conditioned inhibitor, established in conjunction with a particular CS-US pair, transfers its action to other CSs paired with that US, it cannot function simply to interfere with the processing of a particular CS or the action of a particular CS-US association. Rather its action must be on the US representation or on the response production. Similarly, if the transfer excitor happens to evoke a different response form and yet the inhibitor also suppresses that response, it is unlikely that the action is at the point of response production.
A possibility that has received considerable recent attention is that some instances of inhibition involve a stimulus that interferes with a specific CS-US association. That possibility is of particular interest because it would involve a stimulus being associated not with another stimulus but rather with an association between two other stimuli. If in fact an associative relation can itself enter into further associations, this would provide a way for a system built from pair-wise associations to construct more complex relations (cf Mill 1869). Holland (1985) has suggested, in the context conditioned inhibition, that a stimulus might interfere with the functioning of another association. Moreover, Holland (1983) and Rescorla (1985a) have both presented evidence for an analogous but opposite result in which a stimulus apparently promotes the functioning of an association between two other stimuli.
Many of these possibilities remain to be worked out at the behavioral level. But it is clear that conditioned inhibition is a well-established and pervasive notion in modern thinking about Pavlovian conditioning. No attempt to deal with conditioning at a neural level will be judged adequate if it does not provide an associative mechanism for inhibitory phenomena.
Salience
A final notion that is current in theories of associative learning is that of stimulus salience or "associability." Some stimuli seem to enter into associations more readily than do others. This is true whether one looks at stimuli that serve as signals or those that serve as consequences. Certain facts about stimulus salience are well established but not very surprising. For instance, the relative salience of stimuli varies considerably across species. Moreover, within a broad range, more intense stimuli enter more readily into associations. But there are two aspects of stimulus salience that are of more interest.
First, stimulus salience can itself be modified by experience. This can come about either because a stimulus is presented alone or because it bears an associative relation to other stimuli. For instance, I mentioned above that repeated exposure to a stimulus in the absence of a relation to other stimuli can reduce its salience; the phenomena of latent inhibition and the US-preexposure effect are striking instances of this. Conversely, having a stimulus regularly signal some outcome can not only give it the ability to evoke a CR, it can also modify its salience. In fact, such a salience modification is at the heart of several modern theories of blocking. I noted above that conditioning may enable a stimulus to better engage the animal's attention, making it better processed.
In fact, some conditioned responses that one observes may be a manifestation of that improved processing of the CS. In some instances, a major consequence of Pavlovian conditioning may be to allow a CS to elicit more successfully its original response. Although such enhancement of the original response to the CS has sometimes been rejected as not being "true" conditioning, little basis exists for such an attitude (cf Farley Alkon 1985) . If a CS comes to evoke its original response more adequately because of its pairing with the US, but fails to do so when an appropriate control condition is arranged, then the performance is demonstrably dependent upon the arranging of a CS/US relation. That the learning of that relation is exhibited as the enhancement of an original response may be informative about its nature, but it surely is not grounds for banishing it from the hallowed realm of "true" conditioning. One would not want to claim that just because a stimulus is not initially neutral, it cannot serve as a CS entering into new associations. In any case, it seems clear that stimulus salience can be modified by experience.
The second point of interest about salience is that, like many other conditioning parameters, it is not an absolute property of the stimulus independent of the rest of the conditioning experiment. In particular, there is evidence that the salience of a stimulus may vary widely depending on what it is signaling. Some signals are better for some outcomes and others are better for other outcomes. The most well-known case of this comes from the seminal work of Garcia and his collaborators (e.g. Garcia Koelling 1966). For instance, if a rat is presented with an external pain, such as a footshock, it is more likely to associate that shock with an antecedent auditory-visual stimulus than with an antecedent flavor. On the other hand, when exposed to internal malaise the rat is more likely to associate that with an antecedent flavor than an antecedent auditory-visual stimulus. The conditionability of flavors and auditory-visual events is not an absolute property of those stimuli but partly depends on what is being used to condition them. Although there was some concern about the adequacy of the original demonstrations of this phenomenon, subsequent work has placed it on sound ground (e.g. Miller & Domjan 1981) . Moreover, several other instances have come to light and have been investigated with more sophisticated designs (e.g. LoLordo 1979). Some instances make contact with such historically important associative variables as stimulus similarity or spatial contiguity (Rescorla 1980) . Such findings are of considerable importance because they suggest a preexisting bias on the part of the animal making it susceptible to certain CS-US pairings. Behavioral theories of learning have historically emphasized the arbitrariness of the associative process, that the organism can learn any relations among events with which the world presents it. Certainly, many organisms have considerable flexibility in this regard, but clearly for many species repeated generations have faced a stable world that makes it likely that a particular individual will have to learn some associations rather than others. Hence it would be surprising if biases had not developed favoring the learning of certain assoeiationsĨ t is less clear how this bias is accomplished. A variety of mechanisms have been proposed and it seems likely that each has applicability to www.annualreviews.org/aronline Annual Reviews some instance of bias (LoLordo 1979) . It is convenient to describe the alternatives in the context of flavor-aversion learning, although several accounts can be rejected for that particular instance. One possibility is that the bias is not based on the association at all, but instead represents differential sensitization. For instance, receiving a toxin might especially sensitize the animal to flavors rather than to audio-visual stimuli; similarly, shock might sensitize it to audio-visual stimuli. Such sensitization could take a variety of forms, some of which are difficult to rule out in the absence of quite subtle experimental designs (Rescorla & Holland 1976) . Such a nonassociative mechanism is almost surely used on occasion and often would stand the animal in good stead in dealing with the world.
However, there are also a variety of associative alternatives. For instance, one simple possibility is that the animal may come to the experiment with a preexisting association between certain pairs of stimuli. It may not be that some associations form more readily but rather that they form on top of a better base. Such a "head start" on the association might be either genetically derived or based on part experience with the actual organization of the world (e.g. Mackintosh 1973 ). Some authors have gone so far as to claim that only stimuli having such a preexisting relation can become associated with each other. Alternatively, it may not be that some associations form better or even get stronger on top of a better base, but rather that they are more readily exhibited in performance. For instance, an association between a CS and US would be especially easy to see if the response that a US conditions to the CS is compatible with that which the CS evokes on its own. However, if they were incompatible, a similar association might form but have more difficulty being exhibited. It is, of course, precisely for such cases that it is important to use an assortment of assessments of the association. Finally, of course, it might be that the organism is predisposed to learn better the relation between certain stimuli.
These alternatives are often difficult to separate and sometimes quite sophisticated experimental designs are necessary. But fussing over those designs is often worth the trouble, because these different bases for the relativity of salience have quite different implications for neural mechanisms of learning.
CONCLUSION
I have had two aims in review. First, I have described a particular framework within which to view learning processes. That framework forces explicit separation of the learning and assessment phases of learning experiments. The separation emphasizes that the same learning can be measured by an assortment of techniques. Second, I have described four key notions in current thinking about Pavlovian conditioning: contiguity, information, inhibition, and salience. I have described some of the functional relations that obtain in each case. But equally I have pointed to some of the alternative ways in which an instance of learning can occur and some of the tools that are useful for separating those alternatives.
Two points should be emphasized in conclusion. First, how modern theories view Pavlovian conditioning differs substantially from the historical view in which many of us were trained. Conditioning was often historically described as a procedure in which a US that regularly evokes a UR transfers its response to an originally neutral CS by virtue of a CS-US contiguity. The modern view of conditioning as the mechanism by which the organism learns relations among events in its world preserves virtually no aspect of that historical description. Properly assessed, associations can form between USs that either do or do not regularly evoke a response and CSs that are behaviorally neutral or elicit their own responses. Moreover, the learning may show up in a variety of behavioral changes, often as assessed by procedures in which the response bears little relation to that originally evoked by the US. Perhaps most importantly the relation of a simple contiguity completely fails to capture the richness of the stimulus relations that Pavlovian conditioning allows the animal to encode.
Second, one must anticipate that similar learning problems will be solved in different ways by different species. Although many examples of Pavlovian conditioning among mammals seem to share important common properties, it would be naive to think that there is a single associative process by which all animals put together a representation of this environment. It would be misguided to establish rigid criteria such as a list of phenomena that a mechanism must meet in order to be dubbed "true" conditioning. Of course any conditioning mechanism that allows the animal to represent its world adequately will be highly constrained by the properties of the world itself. That constraint will force even divergent conditioning mechanisms to share many gross properties. But in the end, progress at the neurobiological level will depend on prior behavioral analysis delineating how in fact the problem of learning stimulus relations is solved for the species under investigation. What the psychology of learning can offer is the conceptual tools, some alternative theories, and a methodological sophistication for the conduct of that analysis. The long history of behavioral analysis will surely make the path of the informed neurobiologist easier both empirically and conceptually.
